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THE MODAL STATUS OF LAWS: IN DEFENCE OF
A HYBRID VIEW
By Tuomas E. Tahko
Three popular views regarding the modal status of the laws of nature are discussed: Humean Su-
pervenience, nomic necessitation, and scientific/dispositional essentialism. These views are examined
especially with regard to their take on the apparent modal force of laws and their ability to explain
that modal force. It will be suggested that none of the three views, at least in their strongest form, can
be maintained if some laws are metaphysically necessary, but others are metaphysically contingent.
Some reasons for thinking that such variation in the modal status of laws exists will be presented with
reference to physics. This drives us towards a fourth, hybrid view, according to which there are both
necessary and contingent laws. The prospects for such a view are studied.
Keywords: laws, essentialism, metaphysical necessity, physical necessity, natural
kinds, dispositions.
I. INTRODUCTION
There are three popular views regarding the modal status of the laws of
nature: the Humean Supervenience (HS) approach originating in Lewis’s work
(e.g., Lewis 1986), the nomic necessitation approach primarily familiar from Arm-
strong’s (as well as Dretske’s and Tooley’s) work (e.g., Armstrong 1983), and the
scientific/dispositional essentialist approach defended, for instance, by Ellis (2001),
Ellis & Lierse (1994), and Bird (2007).1 All of these views come in many vari-
eties, and there are also alternative approaches, such as Mumford’s (2004) law-
lessness approach, Lowe’s (2006) essentialist approach, and Maudlin’s (2007)
primitivism about laws. The following question regarding Modal Force (MF) is
central to all of these approaches:
(MF) How can one explain the apparent modal force that distinguishes genuine laws
from mere regularities?
1 See Beebee (2000) for a helpful comparison between the first two views.
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510 TUOMAS E. TAHKO
Any complete account of the metaphysics of laws should be able to explain the
apparent modal force presupposed by (MF). But it is not altogether clear what
would count as a satisfactory explanation. In fact, one problem in the extensive
literature concerning laws derives exactly from the very different criteria that
philosophers demand from a satisfactory explanation of the modal force of
laws. The preliminary hypothesis of this paper is that the different criteria can
all be useful—even correct—but they correspond to different types of laws. In
other words, the mistake has been to search for a uniform account.
In their strongest form, each of the three popular views falls to one or the
other end of the extreme regarding the modal status of laws i.e., either all laws
are contingent or all laws are necessary.2 From the viewpoint of Humeanism,
laws are thoroughly contingent, mere regularities that could have been differ-
ent, yet ‘supervene on particular matters of fact’ (Beebee 2000: 572). According
to scientific/dispositional essentialism, laws are metaphysically necessary, in-
timately related to the essential properties of the things they concern. Very
roughly, this difference may be considered to concern the origin or source of
laws: either they originate in the random arrangement of things or they flow
from essential properties.
The nomic necessitation approach has a somewhat misleading name, as
it is in fact at the contingent end of the spectrum. However, Armstrong would
not be happy with either of the two mentioned options regarding the origin
of laws, for he states that the idea of nomic necessitation is exactly that we
can distinguish laws frommere regularities, contra Lewis (Armstrong 1997: 223).
Yet, nomic necessitation does not directly concern metaphysical necessity, which
is what the mentioned spectrum of the two extremes is supposed to capture.3
To be perfectly clear about this, here is a helpful passage from Bird:4
Armstrong wants to capture the idea that nomic necessitation has some kind of modal
force—not the “hard” kind associated with full-on metaphysical necessity, but a “soft”
kind associated with nomic modality (including explanatory force and the ability to
support counterfactuals) and consistent with metaphysical contingency. (Bird 2005: 148)
2 There are some caveats. For instance, Hendry and Rowbottom (2009) argue that (permis-
sive) scientific/dispositional essentialism is compatible with interworld variation in a property’s
dispositional profile, hence giving room for slight variation in laws of nature. Regardless, I will
focus on versions of scientific/dispositional essentialism that defend the necessity of all laws. By
way of justification, Bird (2007: 48 ff.) takes it that consistent dispositional essentialists should be
committed to the necessity of all laws—the alternative would be an ‘untidy metaphysics, with
two classes of laws’ (p. 49).
3 In fact, some nomic necessitation accounts (e.g., Swoyer 1982) do consider all laws to be
metaphysically necessary, but the original Armstrong–Dretske–Tooley account was certainly in
favour of metaphysically contingent laws.
4 Some, like Hendry & Rowbottom (2009), seem to conflate nomic necessitation and disposi-
tional essentialism, claiming that both are committed to the metaphysical necessity of laws. As the
quotation from Bird makes clear, this does not reflect Armstrong’s (original) version of nomic
necessitation. See also Schrenk’s (2011) discussion on Armstrong and nomic necessitation.
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Both Armstrong’s nomic necessitation approach and the Humean branch
reject the view that laws have modal force of the ‘hard’ variety. In this lim-
ited sense, we can lump them together when we examine whether a plausible
account of the apparent modal force of the laws of nature is available. A
comprehensive—or even fair—treatment of HS and the related Best System
Analysis would certainly require a paper of its own. But since such an anal-
ysis is not central to the argument of this paper, I will instead just outline
the similarities between (some versions of) HS and the nomic necessitation
approach.
If we apply Lewis’s (1986: ix) traditional characterization of HS to laws, we
can understand the Humean view as stating that the laws of nature supervene
on the totality of local matters of particular fact (Bird 2007: 82). There is a
particular aspect typical to many variations of HS which is of special interest to
us.5 This aspect is related to a view about properties called categoricalism, or, as
Bird (2007: 66) calls it, categorical monism: all sparse/fundamental properties are
categorical (as opposed to dispositional). The Humean approach holds that
fundamental properties do not have essential causal powers, or indeed any
essential features. Hence, properties are also devoid of immanent modality.
More generally, categorical properties do not ‘metaphysically necessitate any-
thing about property instantiations in wholly distinct regions’ (Loewer 2012:
116). Bird thinks that a commitment to categoricalism, which is shared by the
Armstrong-type nomic necessitation and the Humean approach to laws, is
problematic:
The categoricalist view denies that there are potencies or indeed any other kind of
modality immanent in regularities—the Humean Supervenience thesis says that they
merely supervene on the distribution of categorical properties among particulars (and
furthermore nothing explains that distribution). (Bird 2007: 90)
According to the categoricalist view, laws are contingent regularities that
concern categorical properties. Since a commitment to categoricalism is typi-
cal both for HS and the nomic necessitation view, the scientific/dispositional
essentialistmight hope to refute both viewswith the same argument against cat-
egoricalism, building on Bird (2005). Evidence in favour of immanent modality
in at least some regularities should be enough. In the course of this paper, some
evidence for such modal content will be presented. Hence, in partial agree-
ment with Bird, the hypothesis of this paper is that Armstrong’s ‘soft’ modal
force cannot be enough, at least not for all laws. Given this acknowledgement,
my starting point is evidently closer to the scientific/dispositional essentialist
line than the HS or the nomic necessitation approach. Therefore, even though
5 See Earman & Roberts (2005a,b) for some discussion of the various formulations of HS
and an attempt at and defence of a better formulation. There are no doubt better and worse
formulations of HS out there, but I take it that a core corollary of HS is that there is no modality
immanent in laws, that is, any modality that we associate with laws is a supervenient feature of the
Humean mosaic.
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the positive argument that will be presented is not directly concerned with
any of the mentioned views about laws, a type of essentialist position will be
adopted for the sake of argument. The suggestion is that the truth of thematter
lies somewhere between the two extremes: laws are not mere random regular-
ities or subject only to nomic necessitation, nor are they (all) metaphysically
necessary. This leaves open the possibility that some laws are contingent and
some are necessary—a ‘mixed’ view. Such a view is explicitly denied by Bird
(e.g., 2007.: 48 ff), who gives priority to a unified account.6 But the view to be
presented is not strictly a mix of scientific/dispositional essentialism and the
Humean or nomic necessitation view, but rather a fourth view distinct from
the three popular views, although partly inspired by Lowe’s (2006) essentialist
line. Such a hybrid view bears some resemblance with other recent accounts,
such as Maudlin (2007), Roberts (2008), Hendry and Rowbottom (2009), and
Lange (2009, 2011).
I do not have the space to discuss other hybrid views in detail; instead, I will
focus on offering further support for one version of the hybrid view. Of the
mentioned views, I believe that Hendry and Rowbottom (2009) come closest
to what I have in mind.7 Their view is a type of (permissive) dispositional
essentialism. While I agree with their starting point, namely that anti-quidditism
does not entail nomic necessitation (p. 669), I am more doubtful about a key
element in their positive proposal. This element is the (primitive) similarity
between sets of dispositions—or dispositional profiles of properties. According
to quidditism, the identity of properties is brute: mass and charge, say, could
exchange all their dispositional features without losing their identity; they
have something like a haecceity which secures their identity regardless of their
dispositional features. Hendry and Rowbottom, like many others, regard this
view to be incredible. Instead, they take the complete dispositional profile of
any given property to be vague (p. 674). The question is, just how vague can the
dispositional profile be? If no answer is given, the view runs the risk of having
to return to some type of quidditism after all—not of individual dispositions,
but of the dispositional profiles themselves.
While I am not fully convinced by the line of argument from Hendry and
Rowbottom, there is an important connection between our accounts. The
view that I will present could perhaps be understood as a type of ‘weak’ dis-
positional essentialism, as opposed to the ‘permissive’ type due to Hendry and
Rowbottom as well as the ‘strict’ type that Ellis, among others, defends. Per-
missive dispositional essentialism is anti-quidditist: a property’s identity is de-
termined by its dispositional profile or causal role. But it is also supposed to be
6 Swoyer (1982: 211) is also hostile towards such ‘intermediate’ positions. Roberts (2010), on
the other hand, argues that the scientific/dispositional essentialists are stuck with an ‘untidy’
mixed view because at least some laws turn out to be contingent.
7 Thanks to an anonymous referee for The Philosophical Quarterly for inviting me to explore the
connection to Hendry and Rowbottom in more detail.
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compatible with ‘moderate’ interworld variation in a property’s dispositional
profile. One important difference between permissive dispositional essential-
ism and weak dispositional essentialism of the type that I am about to develop
is that whereas the former emerges simply from the idea that there could be
slight variation in the dispositional profiles of properties, the latter goes some
way towards explaining what might enable this variation. Keina¨nen (2011), in
contrasting Ellis’s view with that of Hendry and Rowbottom, makes a similar
observation, suggesting that ‘The best way to develop ‘a weak dispositionalist
style’ variant of Ellis’s position is to assume that the exact values of certain
natural constants (e.g., the gravitational constant) are contingent’ (p. 423, fn.
9). As it turns out, this is exactly the strategy that I will follow, albeit focusing
on the contingency of the fine structure constant rather than the gravitational
constant.
Partly for dialectical reasons and partly for reasons that I have explored
elsewhere (Tahko forthcoming), I will also adopt a view which is a core com-
mitment for Lowe: natural kind fundamentalism, i.e., the thesis that there are
genuine natural kinds and they form a fundamental ontological category (see
Bird and Tobin 2012: section 1.3). This type of view is defended both by Lowe
and Ellis, and it would be possible to develop my argument from Ellis’s point
of view as well. Moreover, note that this assumption is not in fact necessary
for the task of developing a hybrid view about laws. My choice to adopt it
is largely based on personal preference as I consider the connection between
laws and kinds to be an important one. In any case, the view contrasts with
Armstrong’s approach, which does not posit a distinct category (of universal)
for natural kinds, even though Armstrong thinks that kinds ‘mark true joints in
nature’ (1997: 67). So, the view being developed here is sympathetic to natural
kind fundamentalism as developed by Lowe and Ellis, but it differs from their
versions in some important respects (which will become clear below). To sum
up, the two primary claims that will be put forward are as follows.
1. There is a middle ground between the two extreme views about the modal
status of laws: a hybrid view, according to which some laws are contingent
and some laws are necessary.
2. The distinction between laws that feature fundamental natural kinds and
laws that do not feature kinds reflects the distinction betweenmetaphysically
necessary and metaphysically contingent laws.
The primary contribution of the paper concerns (2). As has been noted, various
hybrid views about laws have been developed in the literature, but for the most
part, I do not share the motivation behind these views. At any rate, there is
more to be said about what explains the different modal status of laws. The next
section examines exactly this—the apparent modal force presupposed by the
initial question of the paper (MF). Some illustrative cases that may give support
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to (1) will also be discussed. In Section III, a critical assessment of Lowe’s
essentialist approach and the connection between laws and natural kinds are
provided. A solution to some of the problems regarding Lowe’s account is
suggested, building on (2). The Sections IV and V concern potential examples
of contingent and necessary laws in light of physics, respectively—both (1) and
(2) will receive further support in these sections. A concluding section follows.
II. THE APPARENT MODAL FORCE OF LAWS
The initial question of this paper (MF) presupposes an apparent modal force
that distinguishes genuine laws from mere regularities. As has been noted, it is
not easy tomake progress regarding this distinction. But something ought to be
said about the source of the modal force of laws. Since I have proposed to adopt
a type of essentialist view at least for the sake of argument, we can start with the
idea that there are certain entities, the natures of which give rise to the causal
powers that these entities manifest. In this type of account, one might suggest
that it is essential that two particles with opposite charges attract each other.
This regularity, according to the essentialist view, will hold in all metaphysically
possible worlds. But this does not yet answer the original question, i.e., what is
the source of the modal force of laws. Importantly, it seems that here we can
make a distinction between what holds in virtue of the essences of, say, charged
particles and what makes it the case that the law(s) governing charged particles
hold across all metaphysically possible worlds—if they indeed do. In other
words, the essentialist story about fundamental properties such as charge that
may explain certain regularities holding across metaphysically possible worlds
is distinguishable from the claim that the more general laws governing the
behaviour of charged particles hold across metaphysically possible worlds.
We could agree that certain regularities hold across metaphysically possible
worlds, for instance, particles with like charges repel each other. However, it
is making an additional commitment to say that the essentialist story about
charge makes it the case that all laws governing charged particles hold in the
same worlds. For instance, perhaps there is room for variation in the magnitude
of the electrostatic interaction, which would also entail changes for other
regularities (such as bonding behaviour).8
As a test case, take the Pauli Exclusion Principle (PEP), which states that no
two fermions in a closed system can occupy the same quantum state at the
same time. For example, two distinct electrons in an atom cannot have all the
same quantum numbers at the same time. The PEP has numerous important
implications. One of them is said to pertain to the space-occupying behaviour
8 I owe a great debt to an anonymous referee for The Philosophical Quarterly for helping me
formulate this idea more clearly.
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THE MODAL STATUS OF LAWS: IN DEFENCE OF A HYBRID VIEW 515
of all matter (we will return to this). But let’s first consider a simpler case,
namely the forming of ionic bonds, such as the bond between sodium and
chlorine in sodium chloride molecules. The PEP illustrates the important role
of the balance in the repulsion and attraction between Na+ and Cl− ions.
As the ions come closer—as required by the regularity of opposite charges
attracting—and the wavefunctions of their electrons overlap, the PEP further
requires that these electrons cannot occupy the same quantum state. The
situation is resolved by a change in the energy levels of the electrons so that no
two identical electrons occupy the same quantum state. This results in Pauli
repulsion, which prevents the ions from coming any closer together. The product
is a stable sodium chloride molecule.
The PEP expresses a regularity which appears to be central to the behaviour
of all material objects; it underlies the ability of molecules to form bonds and
subatomic particles to form atoms. Typically, when we consider something like
the ability of sodium and chloride ions to form bonds, we state the highest
order law that seems relevant. In this case, the most relevant law would seem
to be Coulomb’s law, which states that like charges repel and unlike charges
attract.9 Since Na+ and Cl− ions have opposite polarity, they are apt to bond
and form sodium chloride molecules. With regard to the PEP and Coulomb’s
law, it may be noted that the former is rather more general than the latter.
Coulomb’s law is a popular example in the literature, but the PEP less so.
For instance, Bird (2007: 199) is rather hesitant about the PEP, suggesting that
since Pauli’s original convictionwas that the principlemust have an explanation
within quantum mechanics, it does not state a relationship that is ‘close to’
fundamental, which Bird takes to be a necessary condition for laws. But as
we will see, there are reasons to think that the PEP does state a relationship
that is ‘close to’ fundamental, even if it can be given a further explanation in
quantum mechanics—the ‘fundamentality’ of a given relationship is a rather
arbitrary notion in this discussion. What we will turn to now is the suggestion
that fundamental natural kinds are central to the modal force of laws.
III. LAWS AND KINDS
The suggestion that fundamental natural kinds are central to the modal force
of laws is the core of E.J. Lowe’s account of laws, which partly motivates
the view being developed in this paper. Lowe suggests that if we abandon
9 FollowingMumford (2004: 138), one might think that there is a difference in the status of the
PEP and Coloumb’s law since the former is not called a law whereas the latter is—considerations
like this and the fact that science does not offer us a conclusive list of laws lead Mumford (2004:
ch. 8) to conclude that laws do not form a natural kind (in Ellis’s sense). However, as Bird (2007:
198) has pointed out, that something is not called a ‘law’ does not mean that it is not a law of
nature.
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the categoricalist view, we can offer a more satisfactory explanation of the
modal force of laws. Lowe’s strategy is based on his four-category ontology—
the correctness of which I wish to remain neutral about. But there are some
aspects of his account that are helpful for the view being developed here. Here
is an illustrative passage:
What I can say [. . . ] is that the uniformities in question [concerning the powers and
liabilities of electrons] are explained by the fact that electrons are all particular instances
of the same fundamental natural kind, which is governed by a number of laws linking this
kind with certain attributes. And I can explain the absence of other regularly occurring
combinations of powers and liabilities in terms of the non-existence of any kinds of
particle governed by suitable laws. (Lowe 2006: 161)
Lowe proposes that we should explain laws in terms of the natures of natural
kinds. For instance, it is supposedly a part of the nature of the kind ‘electron’ that
its instances have unit negative charge. This particular essentialist fact (partly)
explains certain regularities, such as the net negative charge of chloride ions.
Similarly, it is a part of the nature of the kind ‘fermions’ that two fermions
in a closed system cannot occupy the same quantum state at the same time,
as the PEP states. This analysis also applies to the famous example about
the universal lack of solid spheres of gold or uranium of a mile in diameter.
According to Lowe (2006: 157), the case of uranium constitutes a law because
it stems from the nature of the element uranium, whereas there is nothing in
the nature of the element gold that would rule out solid spheres of gold a mile
in diameter.
Promising as Lowe’s linemay seem,Bird (2012: 97–9) has recently challenged
this type of approach to laws, arguing that Lowe’s analysis breaks down in cases
such as Coulomb’s law, which does not seem to feature any fundamental natural
kinds.10 The problem is that if all laws are explained in terms of kinds, then it
seems that Lowe would have to postulate a natural kind which is governed by
Coulomb’s law. Since Coulomb’s law applies to allmaterial objects, the kind in
question would have to be all-encompassing—a peculiar kind indeed.11 Bird’s
10 This usage of ‘fundamental’ should not be confused with a fundamental ontological category.
Lowe (2006: 8) defines a fundamental ontological category as follows: ‘the existence and identity
conditions of entities belonging to that category cannot be exhaustively specified in terms of on-
tological dependency relations between those entities and entities belonging to other categories’.
Recall that, for Lowe, natural kinds constitute one of the four fundamental ontological categories.
But what Lowe seems to have in mind when he talks about ‘fundamental natural kinds’ in this
connection is ‘fundamental’ in the sense of ‘elementary’ or ‘basic’, e.g., electrons are thought to
be fundamental particles and hence a fundamental (basic, simple) natural kind (Lowe 2006: 154).
11 Admittedly, scientific essentialists, like Ellis, might argue that Coulomb’s law involves higher
order determinable natural kinds, even if no fundamental natural kinds. However, this reply
would not seem to be available to Lowe, who avoids the determinate-determinable distinction
and states that: ‘The form of a law, in the simplest case, is just this, on my view: substantial kind
K is characterized by Fness, or, even more simply, K is F ’ (p. 132). For Lowe, a metaphysically
necessary law must feature a fundamental natural kind, and Coulomb’s law does not appear to
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central point is that some laws do not seem to feature fundamental natural
kinds, and hence Lowe’s analysis cannot apply to them.
A potential line of reply for Lowe would be to suggest that there is, after all,
a perfectly familiar type of kind that Coulomb’s law can be associated with,
namely, material body.12 Even though ‘material body’ would be a rather general
kind, it is certainly a very familiar one: Newton’s laws of motion explicitly
refer to such bodies exerting forces and being subjected to forces. But even if
we were to accept that ‘material body’ is a natural kind, there are still more
general laws that do not seem to feature any kinds, such as the conservation
laws. Unless we are willing to go out on a limb and insist that physical systems,
quite generally, constitute a natural kind, then it appears that the connection
between kinds and laws required by Lowe is not forthcoming.
But perhaps there is a simple explanation for the apparent disjointness of
laws and kinds. Here is one possibility: the distinction between laws that feature
fundamental natural kinds and laws that do not feature kinds reflects the distinc-
tion between metaphysically necessary and metaphysically contingent laws. Lowe himself
has not entertained this type of reply, and it is doubtful that he would find it
appealing. There are at least two reasons why this reply conflicts with Lowe’s
view. First, it entails that if there are only very few metaphysically necessary
laws, then it may be possible to account for those laws with the help of only very
few genuine natural kinds, contrary to what Lowe seems to think.13 Secondly,
and more importantly, Lowe leaves room for metaphysically contingent laws
which do feature natural kinds. Nevertheless, the line is worth pursuing for it
enables us to salvage what is perhaps themost fruitful aspect of Lowe’s account,
namely, distinguishing between contingent law-like regularities and metaphys-
ically necessary laws. There may be alternative solutions available for the
scientific/dispositional essentialist, but the scientific/dispositional essentialist
will, in turn, have difficulties accommodating the apparent contingency of
some laws, as will be argued in the next section.
Why should we think that laws could come in two different varieties in the
first place? Can we attribute somemodal force to contingent, law-like regulari-
ties?The answers to these questions reflect the distinction betweennomological
(or physical/natural) and metaphysical modality. As we will shortly see, there
are good reasons to think that some of the best candidates for metaphysically
necessary laws do indeed feature natural kinds. But it would be odd to deny
the status of law to something like Coloumb’s law, which certainly expresses an
satisfy this requirement—this will be discussed in more detail below. On this, see also Wilson’s
(2012) recent paper, which defends the existence of fundamental determinables.
12 Lowe has suggested this reply in discussion.
13 By ‘genuine’ natural kinds, I mean mind-independent or ‘joint-carving’ rather than con-
ventional kinds. See also Lowe (2009: chs 9 and 12). However, the view being developed here does
not entail that there must be only very few natural kinds—this is an upshot that I have examined
elsewhere (Tahko forthcoming), based on issues concerning chemical kinds in particular.
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important regularity in nature. Admittedly, this explanation calls for a further
analysis of our epistemic access to the natures of kinds as well as metaphysically
necessary laws—a task which I cannot hope to fully accomplish here. But even
if these essentialist facts were to be considered brute facts, this view has its ad-
vantages over competitors (see Lowe 2006: 161). However, at this point it should
be stressed that the type of view being developed here does not necessarily
require a commitment to (Lowe-type) natural kind fundamentalism. It would
be possible to develop a hybrid approach very similar to the one proposed
here strictly in terms of, say, determinable magnitudes instead of fundamental
natural kinds. For Lowe, it is important that we distinguish between funda-
mental determinable magnitudes (such as mass and charge) and fundamental
natural kinds, but the former might make for a less scientifically controversial
view as physics clearly deals with fundamental determinable magnitudes, but
not so obviously with fundamental natural kinds. Nevertheless, here I will
continue to develop the view based on natural kind fundamentalism, as this is
an additional commitment that I am willing to make (and defend).14
According to the proposed view, the apparent modal force of laws can
be explained as follows. Some laws are metaphysically necessary because
they feature natural kinds, but others are metaphysically contingent, law-like
regularities, much like the Humean line suggests. The latter can also be said
to have modal force, but only in the ‘soft’ sense that Bird attributes to the
nomic necessitation approach, as opposed to the ‘hard’ sense of metaphysical
modality (Bird 2005: 148). In fact, part of the reason why each of the competing
views about laws has some appeal may be that typically the examples discussed
by scientific/dispositional essentialists involve laws that are somewhat plausible
candidates for metaphysically necessary laws, whereas the Humean view may
be supported by citing cases where it appears to be relatively straightforward
to come up with regularities different from the actual ones.
This sudden, even if only partial, agreement with the Humean may seem
odd given that this paper started out with an explicit commitment to essential-
ism. The reason for this move is that even though the Humean may struggle
to explain the ‘hard’ modal force of metaphysically necessary laws—of which
there could be very few—it is enough, in the case of metaphysically contingent
yet nomologically necessary laws, to explain the ‘soft’ modal force. Or, at any
rate, there is an analysis in the vicinity of the Humean Best System Analysis
which is capable of explaining nomological necessity in terms of natural prop-
erties rather than natural kinds. The appropriate distinction of laws and mere
law-like regularities is hence tripartite:
1. Metaphysically necessary laws that feature fundamental natural kinds.
14 For further discussion regarding natural kinds, see Tahko (forthcoming). I owe this insight
to an anonymous referee for The Philosophical Quarterly.
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THE MODAL STATUS OF LAWS: IN DEFENCE OF A HYBRID VIEW 519
2. Nomologically necessary but metaphysically contingent laws that do not
feature natural kinds (perhaps they feature natural properties instead).
3. Mere accidental, metaphysically and nomologically contingent regularities
(not genuine laws).
Are there any reasons to think that the proposed ‘hybrid’ view is correct?
Consider, once again, the problematic status of Coulomb’s law. Bird (2001,
2002) has discussed it extensively in connection to his attempt to defend the
view that (all) laws are metaphysically necessary:
Given the existence of salt andwater, Coulomb’s law of electrostatic attraction is sufficient
to make the former dissolve in the latter. So any possible world in which salt failed to
dissolve in water would be one in which Coulomb’s law is false. However, it is also the
case that the existence of salt depends on Coulomb’s law. If Coulomb’s law is false then
salt cannot exist. So there is no possible world in which salt exists and in which it does
not dissolve in water. (Bird 2002: 257)
On the face of it, Coulomb’s law may appear to be a fairly good candidate for
a metaphysically necessary law, but as we have seen, it is not clear how it could
even be understood as a law from Lowe’s point of view. On the other hand,
Beebee (2002) has challenged Bird’s analysis of Coulomb’s law, defending the
Humean view according to which it must be contingent:15
The fault in Bird’s argument is the assumption that other possible worlds work in a nice,
orderly way. In particular, the argument assumes that for a law like Coulomb’s law to be
false at a world wi, it has to be false in a nice, consistent, regular way. (Beebee 2002: 254)
Beebee concludes, correctly it seems, that we can introduce some peculiar,
disjunctive ‘law’ which enables the existence of salt in a world, but where
Coulomb’s law is false. According to the view being developed here, this is
exactly because Coulomb’s law does not feature a fundamental natural kind. In
the following section, an attempt will bemade to demonstrate themetaphysical
contingency of some laws of type (2).
IV. CONTINGENT LAWS
In order tomotivate the proposed ‘hybrid’ view, we ought to find plausible cases
of metaphysically contingent yet nomologically necessary laws on one hand,
and metaphysically necessary laws on the other hand. Let us first examine
whether some laws could be contingent.16 Beebee’s case for the contingency of
Coulomb’s law notwithstanding, I believe that the best case for the contingency
15 Where wi is a world in which electrostatic attraction is, ‘necessarily, the force that exists
(at wi) between charged objects in virtue of some law or other that takes values of charges and
separation as input and F as output’ (Beebee 2002: 253).
16 See also Lowe’s (2006: 169–71) case for the contingency of some laws.
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of laws will take advantage of empirical considerations. Recent discussion
concerning fundamental physical constants and their possible variation over
time is of interest in this regard.
It has been suggested that at least some of the fundamental physical con-
stants may vary over time (and even over space). Consider the fine structure
constant (sometimes called the electromagnetic force coupling constant), α,
which characterizes the strength of the electromagnetic interaction, and the
electron to proton mass ratio. Recent astrophysical observations of quasars appear
to point towards variation of α over time.17 However, there are some experi-
mental limitations in determining the variation of fundamental constants. In
particular, if all the constants were to vary together so that their ratios would
remain the same, it would presumably be impossible to establish this observa-
tionally. In any case, the case for α as a constant does not seem as firm as we
once thought.
Note that the fine structure constant is a dimensionless constant which is
expressed in terms of other physical constants, namely the elementary charge,
the electric constant, the Planck constant, and the speed of light. The numerical value
of α−1 is just over 137. A change in a dimensionless constant implies that the
proportions between constants have changed. There have been attempts to
explain the change in the value of α in terms of a change in the value of the
electric constant, but it has also been suggested that the speed of light could
vary.18 Even a fairly modest change in a constant like α would have dramatic
implications. The value of α−1 must lie somewhere between 180 and 85, or
else protons will decay too rapidly, and the unification of fundamental forces
(omitting gravitation of course, since it has not been unified with the other
forces as of yet) will not be possible (Barrow 2001: 147).
So it seems that α may vary over time, but what of it? Well, I would sug-
gest that actual variation over time constitutes at least prima facie evidence
for variation over metaphysically possible worlds. That is, given the actual
variation of α over time, it does not seem to be unreasonable to imagine, say,
that α could’ve had a different initial value and perhaps also a different rate
of change over time. If this is the case, then it would appear to be easy to
imagine that the laws of nature that involve the fine structure constant could
have been different—these include all laws that concern quantum electrody-
namics and indeed the example we have already discussed, Coulomb’s law.
Importantly, quantum electrodynamics applies to all electromagnetic phenom-
ena associated with charged fundamental particles. Accordingly, the objection
familiar from Bird (2012) could once again be applied, since a natural kind
17 See Uzan (2003), and more recently Webb et al. (2011). There is still some debate about
these results, but it seems that the variation of α over time is at least one possible explanation for
the recent empirical results.
18 See Kragh (2003) for some historical details.
 by guest on February 8, 2016
http://pq.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
THE MODAL STATUS OF LAWS: IN DEFENCE OF A HYBRID VIEW 521
encompassing all charged fundamental particles would not seem to fit the
Lowe-inspired ontology of natural kind fundamentalism that we have been
working with. Yet, it seems unreasonable to deny the status of law for
Coulomb’s law, and indeed all laws involving quantum electrodynamics, just
because they do not involve natural kinds. These laws clearly capture im-
portant, presumably nomologically necessary regularities in nature, and the
Humean analysis of such laws appears plausible in the face of empirical data.
But is actual variation of α over time sufficient to establish variation of laws
over possible worlds? One could at least object that simply the fact that α could
have had a different value is not sufficient to establish that the laws of nature
that it influences could have been different for the laws could be such that
they allow for certain limited variation of α, perhaps roughly within the values
mentioned above, i.e., between 1/180 and 1/85. Perhaps the fine structure
constant could be tuned in such a manner that it must fall within a specific
range in all metaphysically possible worlds, and hence the variation of α over
time is part of what is in fact metaphysically necessary about the laws that
it influences. A related line of thought has been explored by Marc Lange,
who suggests that rather than being evidence for a ‘temporary law’, this type
of variation over time is evidence for an ‘eternal (albeit time dependent) law’
(Lange 2008: 88). However, as Lange readily admits (p. 90, fn. 18), his argument
for the immutability of laws is based on a specific analysis of the laws’ relation
to counterfactuals, which will not be acceptable to everyone (e.g., Lewis). But
Lange’s analysis is very much to the point given the present discussion: he
argues that both in a Lewisian and in an Armstrongian analysis of laws, the
immutability of laws over time must be brought in as an external element—if
it is desired in the first place. Yet, this type of solution in the case at hand, it
seems, would be based on a previous (ad hoc) commitment to the metaphysical
necessity of the laws that α influences rather than any independent restrictions
on the value of α. The burden of proof, I would insist, is on the necessitarian
about laws.
There are further complications. One of them concerns the typical but
problematic assumption that individual laws could vary across metaphysically
possible worlds. Lange’s analysis, which treats laws as a system, takes this into
account: ‘The laws derive their lawhood collectively; their sub-nomic stability
means that they are together as resilient under sub-nomic counterfactuals sup-
positions as they could together be. They form a unified, integrated whole—a
system’ (Lange 2011: 66). This is one reason why I am here focusing on a
particular physical constant rather than a particular law—interfering with the
fine structure constant will require changes throughout the system. The idea is
that we should consider an alternative system entirely when dealing with the
variation of laws over possible worlds. For Lange, this gives rise to ‘different
grades of natural necessity’, which he contrasts with the flat picture defended
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by Ellis and Bird that associates a strong type of necessity (i.e., metaphysical
necessity) with all laws (p. 71). In contrast, the view being developed in this
paper suggests that there are indeed different grades of necessity at play, but
the crucial division is between natural and metaphysical necessity.
Let me recap the thought. If we have evidence of the time dependence of
some law, l (let us assume that l features the fine structure constant), then this
constitutes at least a prima facie reason for thinking that l is metaphysically
contingent. It does not guarantee that l is contingent—there is still room for l
(as well as other laws in which constants such as α figure) to be structured
in such a way that its time dependence is metaphysically necessary, that is,
happens at the exact same rate in all metaphysically possible worlds. But the
phenomenon of time dependence makes it exceedingly easy to conceive of
scenarios where the rate of change is slightly different, where the initial value
of α is slightly different, or indeed where α is truly constant (as physicists
thought, until recently). I do not think that conceivability entails metaphysical
possibility, but in this case the leap is not particularly drastic. Moreover, one
might think that a time dependent law is not a law at all, but I believe that
this is a mistake: What if all laws turn out to be time dependent? Even in
that case, we would likely wish to salvage a sense of lawhood—perhaps it
is simply overall theoretical consistency that constitutes a reason to consider
time dependent laws to be laws in the first place. Yet, such constraints do not
obviously reach other possible worlds. So, it is at least arguable that laws in
other possible worlds are more sensitive to variation over time and hence not
obviously subject the same laws at all.19
The upshot of this line of thought reflects Lange’s (2011: 72) reaction towards
the dispositional/scientific essentialist’s case for the metaphysical necessity of
laws. We may ask: Why assume that all we need to explain the metaphysical
necessity of laws governing the behaviour of charged particles is that it’s
essential that two particles with opposite charges attract each other? In other
words, even if the essentialist story is correct, it takes more to show that the
relevant essences are capable of securing the necessity of the laws in which
they feature. Moreover, unless there is more to the dispositional/scientific
essentialist’s story, there is nothing in principle that prevents someone with
Humean sympathies from thinking that some of the regularities we observe
are metaphysically contingent, even if there were certain more ‘privileged’
laws featuring fundamental natural kinds that function more or less like the
essentialist account suggests.
19 Thanks to Matti Eklund and Henrik Ryde´hn for discussion on this point. As various
commentators have pointed out, this argument is hardly conclusive. I certainly acknowledge
this, and regret that I have little more to say in its defence at this time. The status of time
dependent laws with regard to variation over possible worlds is an interesting area for further
research.
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As an attempted rejoinder, the necessitarian about laws might suggest that
the less privileged, metaphysically contingent laws must be grounded in some
more fundamental, necessary laws and hencemore fundamental natural kinds.
Yet, the examples that we have been discussing based on the fine structure
constant concern some of the seemingly most fundamental laws that we know
of, such as the notorious Coulomb’s law. The electric constant, 0, which
features in Coulomb’s law, is as good a candidate for a fundamental physical
constant as any, so it is difficult to see how the necessitarian could explain
the variation of α unless some new physics helps to ground it in even more
fundamental laws and kinds.
On the basis of the previous discussion, I take it that we have a fairly strong
case against the view that all laws are metaphysically necessary. In fact, even
the case for the necessity of any laws seems to face a serious obstacle, as the
fine structure constant is crucial for a great number of supposed laws. One
potential resolution is that nomologically necessary laws can take the form of
boundary conditions for given constants, as was suggested above in terms of
the fine structure constant. However, this is unlikely to be sufficient for ‘hard’
(metaphysically necessary) modal force because it appears that there could
be metaphysically possible worlds where the same constants have radically
different values and simply do not give rise to the same laws. But as has been
suggested, those laws that feature natural kinds may fare better.
V. NECESSARY LAWS
The view being outlined here is sympathetic to certain aspects of Lowe’s
analysis of laws, specifically the idea that laws may be best understood as facts
about the natures of fundamental natural kinds, where ‘nature’ refers to the
attributes of a kind of thing (see Lowe 2006: 173). However, where the view
differs from Lowe’s is in claiming that not all laws must feature natural kinds.
Indeed, it is consistent with (although not entailed by) the view that only very
few laws feature natural kinds. The laws that do feature natural kinds have a
privileged status: they are metaphysically necessary. This idea, combined with
the previous case against the metaphysical necessity of some or evenmost laws,
suggests that the attributes of a given kind of thing may only rarely be essential
to the kind, especially in complex cases. Lowe himself considers the law that
‘electrons have a unit negative charge’ a plausible candidate for a necessary
law, since it involves an elementary particle. In general, his idea seems to be
that the simpler the kind in question, the more likely it is that all or most of
its attributes are essential to it. This strategy is hardly conclusive without a full
theory of natural kinds, but constructing such a theory is beyond the scope
of the present paper (but see Tahko forthcoming). However, those who are
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sceptical about the existence of any genuine natural kinds may consider the
claim to be conditional. That is, the case for metaphysically necessary laws
becomes conditional on the existence of genuine natural kinds:
(COND-MET) If there are genuine natural kinds, any law which features only such
kinds is metaphysically necessary. Furthermore, only those laws which feature genuine
kinds are metaphysically necessary.
It will not be possible to offer a conclusive case in favour of (COND-MET)
here. What can be offered is a further case study, similar to the one concerning
contingent laws. These case studies are neither sufficient to establish that laws
that involve genuine natural kinds are always metaphysically necessary nor
sufficient to establish that laws that do not involve genuine natural kinds are
nevermetaphysically necessary. But what they do establish is that some sort of a
hybrid view is likely to be correct. (COND-MET) is a speculative explanation
regarding the ontological basis of this hybrid view.
The case study in favour of the metaphysical necessity of laws is already
familiar to us: the PEP and fermions—which are featured in the principle—
make for a plausible candidate.20 Recall what the PEP states: if we have
two identical and indistinguishable electrons (or other fermions) in a closed
system, the wavefunction for the system of those two electrons must be anti-
symmetric. Electrons occupy successively higher orbitals to prevent a shared
quantum state, and hence not all electrons can collapse to the lowest orbital.
It is a property of any closed system, such as an atom, that any two electrons
in that closed system do not have the same set of the four quantum numbers.
When the conception of laws at hand is applied to this case, a plausible way
to understand the PEP is in terms of the attributes of electrons and other
fermions. In particular, it is part of the nature of fermions that they behave in a
manner that is constrained by the PEP. This may be the result of a combination
of the modal constraints that particular attributes of fermions—such as their
half-integer spin—have. The role of spin is highlighted by the fact that particles
of half-integer spin must have anti-symmetric wavefunctions, whereas particles
of integer spin must have symmetric wavefunctions. The latter, bosons, are not
subject to the PEP.21
Clearly, the fact that the behaviour of fermions is constrained by the PEP
is at least partly due to their half-integer spin, given that in the view under
consideration, metaphysically necessary laws are simply facts about the na-
tures of natural kinds. It is also plausible that half-integer spin is essential for
fermions, since it is what differentiates them from bosons; the behaviour of
20 Here the focus is on reasons for thinking that PEP is metaphysically necessary. For further
evidence on why it must feature a genuine natural kind, see Tahko (2012).
21 It is, however, not implausible that bosons as well constitute a genuine natural kind.
Accordingly, there may be different metaphysically necessary laws featuring bosons.
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fermions and bosons is radically different, especially at low temperatures. If
Lowe (2006: 169–70) is right about how simple kinds and their attributes are
linked, this would suggest that both fermions and bosons have most of their at-
tributes essentially, that is, they depend for their existence and identity on these
attributes. Hence, both would be likely candidates for genuine kinds. But recall
that the present argument (based on (COND-MET)) is only conditional—the
real battle for natural kinds will have to take place elsewhere.
In light of the above, the PEP is one plausible candidate—themost plausible
that I have been able to come up with—for a metaphysically necessary law
of nature, even though I do not claim to have conclusively demonstrated this.
However, even if the PEP itself did not hold by metaphysical necessity, some
law very similar to it would likely be necessary as any binding behaviour, or
indeed the stability of matter, would seem to require something like the PEP.
Of course, if a universe with no binding behaviour is metaphysically possible,
then this might serve as a counterexample—at least there would presumably
be no complex kinds in such a universe.22 But that would be an odd universe
indeed: to serve as a counterexample, it should contain fermions. If what
was said above about PEP was correct, then these fermions would have to
lack features like half-integer spin, since features like half-integer spin entail
modal constraints such as the one that the PEP states. However, these are the
very constraints that enable binding behaviour in the first place. To all ends
and purposes, then, those odd fermions would appear to behave like—and
be indistinguishable from—bosons. A universe with no binding behaviour is
plausibly a universe with no fermions, and a universe with no fermions is
not a valid counterexample to the metaphysical necessity of the PEP, since it
does not contain the natural kind featured in the PEP.23 This corroborates
(COND-MET).
Of course, there is an obvious caveat here: the argument constructed above
assumes anti-quidditism—the view that the identity of properties is not brute—
at least in the case of fermions. If there are metaphysically possible worlds with
fermions∗ that are not constrained by some analogue of the PEP and hence
fail to fill the causal role of the actual fermions, then only a quidditist would
have the tools to identify fermions and fermions∗. However, I consider the
burden of proof to be strictly on the quidditist—and here I am surely with the
majority (e.g., Mumford 2004: 104). Moreover, since I have adopted a type of
essentialist approach in the first place, I would hope that this justifies asserting
anti-quidditism in the case of fermions, even if I do acknowledge the need to
22 By this I do not mean an absolutely empty universe, whether or not such a universe is
metaphysically possible. An empty universe would not be a suitable counterexample because it
would also lack anything that could be constrained by the PEP. More generally, if we understand
laws as facts about the natures of natural kinds, then possible worlds where the kind does not
exist are not viable counterexamples.
23 We could perhaps say that the PEP is vacuously true in such worlds.
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defend this assumption in more detail. Anti-quidditism may beg the question
against the Humean, but this should be excusable given the dialectic of the
paper. In particular, if the view developed here is understood as a type of ‘weak’
dispositional essentialism, then it is intimately connected to anti-quidditism at
the outset. As Hendry and Rowbottom put it when outlining their ‘permissive’
dispositional essentialism, ‘if the modal intuitions concerning quiddities and
counternomic situations have somepull, howeverweak, a position that honours
them will have an advantage over both quidditism and strict dispositional
essentialism’ (Hendry and Rowbottom 2009: 672).
VI. CONCLUSION
It is a theoretical advantage of the view that I have outlined that no single
case can refute it. If we acknowledge that some laws are metaphysically nec-
essary, but not all of them (and if we are fallibilist about which laws are
necessary and which ones are not), then it is possible to agree with the
scientific/dispositional essentialist about some cases and with various
Humeans about others. We can even change our minds about specific cases as
new evidence emerges. This conception about the status of laws is no doubt
closer to the scientific/dispositional essentialist view, but it is truly a hybrid
view, and the manner in which I have laid it out—by assuming a type of es-
sentialist position and natural kind fundamentalism—is by no means the only
possibility. To motivate this view, it was suggested that we have good reasons
to think that some laws are metaphysically necessary, whereas some laws are
metaphysically contingent yet nomologically necessary. This is enough to cause
trouble both for the Humean about laws as well as the scientific/dispositional
essentialist view—at least in their strongest form—since the former regards
all laws as metaphysically contingent, whereas the latter generally regards all
laws as metaphysically necessary.
Before concluding, one objection should be anticipated. If the preceding
line of thought is correct, it might be argued that no reason has been given
to consider metaphysically contingent laws to be laws at all. Why shouldn’t
we just say that all laws are metaphysically necessary—because they feature
natural kinds—andwhat remains are not genuine laws, whether nomologically
necessary or not? Indeed, the view at hand does suggest that there is an
ontological difference between metaphysically contingent and metaphysically
necessary laws. There is no reason to consider this approach to be ‘untidy’, in
contrast to Bird, since the difference between these two classes of laws can be
explained in virtue of their source. But the metaphysically contingent laws may
certainly be called something else than laws if one so wishes. Perhaps better,
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we could call contingent laws weak and necessary laws strong, reflecting their
modal force and applicability—I prefer these labels to Bird’s ‘soft’ and ‘hard’.
The resulting view, that some laws are metaphysically contingent and some
necessary, is perhaps easier to accept for a scientific/dispositional essentialist,
since the view does still hold that metaphysically necessary laws emerge from
the natures or essences of kinds. Hence, even if there were only very few
metaphysically necessary laws of nature, it is in fact the source of the modal
constraints imposed by laws that is at issue here. Since the proponents of HS
and nomic necessitation deny that there could be any immanent modality
involved in laws, they have no easy way to account for the source of these
modal constraints in the case of metaphysically necessary laws. The case of
the PEP demonstrates that at least some laws do appear to impose modal
constraints of the metaphysical sort—insofar as they feature genuine natural
kinds.24
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